Policy-Making at the Fowler FCC: How Speeches Figured In by Brenner, Daniel
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 10 | Number 2 Article 4
1-1-1987
Policy-Making at the Fowler FCC: How Speeches
Figured In
Daniel Brenner
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel Brenner, Policy-Making at the Fowler FCC: How Speeches Figured In, 10 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 539 (1987).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol10/iss2/4
Policy-Making at the Fowler FCC:
How Speeches Figured In
by DANIEL BRENNER*
The influence of government speech writers varies consider-
ably. Few who do this for a living can properly claim to be stu-
dents of Svengali,1 hypnotically directing the thoughts and
words of the principal. On the other hand, a speech-writer
must do more than simply string together ideas jotted down
during a brainstorming session with the boss. And on policy
matters, the speech-writer should help the principal develop
plans of action and, ideally, a philosophy of regulation.
In comedy writing, the rule is, funny stays in. In recitals of
history, accuracy and the search for truth guide. In policy ad-
dresses, rules are less clear. Too great a degree of clarity in
evolving areas approaches the appearance of prejudgment. On
the other hand, no official intentionally wants to bore an audi-
ence, however much he or she may appear to be striving to do
SO.
What can an independent government official like a Federal
Communications Commission chairman aim for? Not seeking
reelection or campaign contributions, there is no necessity to
flatter an audience or curry pecuniary or voting booth favor.
Reappointment is an issue for some, but the average tenure on
the FCC falls short of a full term. The use of the office to pro-
mote business opportunities through the. revolving door be-
tween the private and public sectors is not as effective as
before, given the glut of qualified communications lawyers and
lobbyists. Instead, ideas predominate. Their discussion and
adoption become the focus of a writing and speaking campaign.
Like the President who appointed him, FCC Chairman Mark
Fowler understood the importance of communicating ideas to
* B.A., A.M., Stanford University, 1973; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1976. Direc-
tor, Communications Law Program and Adjunct Professor, U.C.L.A. School of Law.
Attorney-Advisor (1979-84), Senior Advisor (1984-86), Office of the Chairman, Fed-
eral Communications Commission.
1. Svengali was the musician and hypnotist in George Du Maurier's 1894 novel
Trilby.
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change policy. "Phrasemaking" was a virtue he cherished, re-
ducing concepts to pointed, perhaps memorable, expressions.
This FCC tradition started with the most famous Chairman's
speech of all, Newton Minow's "vast wasteland" address to the
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) in 1961.2 The
chairmen between Minow and Fowler3 were often individuals
who enjoyed a gift of rhetoric, contributing to the lively tradi-
tion of public speaking by the FCC Chair.
No doubt this forensic prowess develops partly from the cycle
of speeches that the chairman of the FCC gives. Leading off
with the Politburo-style International Radio-Television Society
(IRTS) luncheon in New York City in early autumn, the FCC
Chair receives dozens of requests for speeches. The IRTS
event, boasting a dais the destruction of which would signal the
end of the New York based media and advertising world as we
know it, 4 must be a heady experience for any government offi-
cial. Beyond that platform are the rostrums of the enormous
conventions of broadcasters at which a chairman is expected to
appear.
The NAB annual meeting, which attracts around 30,000 con-
ventioneers, is the largest of a series of speaking engagements
that arise in the calendar of an FCC chairman. Less grandiose,
but no less significant, are addresses to universities, public in-
terest groups, and the opportunities to appear before commit-
tees of Congress.
Given this array of speaking opportunities, the royal, though
recently somewhat crabbed, hospitality5 shown to an FCC com-
missioner by the host, and the opportunity to speak about one
2. Speech to National Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), reprinted in N.
MINOW, EQUAL TIME 52 (1964).
3. These include E. William Henry (1963-66), Rosel H. Hyde (1966-69), Dean
Burch (1969-74), Richard E. Wiley (1974-77), Charles D. Ferris (1977-81), and Robert
E. Lee (1981).
4. The gravity of this risk is pictorially represented each autumn in Broadcast-
ing's photo of the event, see, e.g., BROADCASTING, Oct. 5, 1987, at 37.
5. Thanks to a request by the FCC General Counsel, the Government Ethics
Office in 1987 severely restricted the hospitality permitted to be shown an FCC (or
any, for that matter) government official. Generally, buying a commissioner lunch to
discuss an issue or get acquainted, whether it be lawyer or reporter, is forbidden. This
prohibition starkly contrasts with the tradition of Broadcasting's longtime publisher,
Sol Taischoff, of dining on Mondays with the FCC chairman. See BROADCASTING,
Aug. 23, 1982, at 32-33. This tradition more or less ended with Charles Ferris, who
responded to the luncheon invitation by inviting Mr. Taischoff to a brown bag meal at
the FCC. Declining, Mr. Taischoff and Chairman Ferris became less than best
friends. A rapprochement was effected toward the end of the Ferris Administration.
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of society's most observed and debated group of industries, it is
no wonder that Mark Fowler viewed speech-making as an im-
portant component of his tenure. Add to the fact that Chair-
man Fowler served longer than any other chairman in FCC
history6 and the importance of the speech-making constant
grows even larger.
In general, a speech-writer does not "write" a speech. This
observation applies to the work I did for Chairmen Fowler and
Charles Ferris, his Democratic predecessor. It is probably un-
fair even to say that speech-writing amounts to a collaborative
effort. The fact remains that the principal, whether it be a
Chair of the FCC, U.S. Senator or dean of a law school, is in
charge. The words spoken, ultimately, are the responsibility of
the speaker.
As I was also legal advisor to Chairman Fowler, my policy
views and legal opinions carried some weight in the office. A
word, then, is in order about the role of the legal advisor. In
the communications policy firmament, few jobs are as interest-
ing, and sometimes as exasperating, as being the communica-
tion law's equivalent of the Commander-in-Chief's legal
lieutenant. Anyone who assumes one of these jobs, which are
similar to the role of staff counsel on Capitol Hill, or special
assistant in the Executive Branch, must be willing to represent
the viewpoints of the principal faithfully and zealously.
Whether it is a congressman or a commissioner, that individual
is a client. But as in any client-lawyer relationship, the views of
the principal and the deputy may not be identical.
At the FCC, expertise, more than partisanship, has proved
the relevant qualification for an assistant's slot. Willard Nich-
ols, Chief of Staff under Mark Fowler, also served in policy
roles for Chairman Richard Wiley, a Republican, and Chair-
man Ferris, a Democrat. Henry Geller was General Counsel
and legal advisor for chairmen appointed by Presidents Ken-
nedy, Johnson and Nixon and served as head of National Tele-
communications and Information Administration under
President Carter.
My speech-writing service for Chairman Fowler began al-
most as an accident. During the few weeks I had stayed on to
help smooth the transition between chairmen, I worked on one
of Chairman Fowler's first speeches. In it, he expressed the
6. Mark Fowler served as Chairman from May 18, 1981 to April 17, 1987.
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theme, by then well associated with the Reagan administration
(and in truth, with President Carter 7) of cutting back on gov-
ernment overregulation of broadcasting.'
Over the summer of 1981, Chairman Fowler and I worked on
a law review article to express in detail a philosophy about
what was wrong with broadcast regulation and what the FCC
and Congress might do to change it.9 Three important themes
which characterized his approach to broadcasting grew out of
that article.
First, regulation of broadcasting had to be made more ra-
tional. Reliance on platitudes about government superinten-
dence over programming, maintenance of paperwork
requirements that bore no rational relation to the actual regu-
lation of broadcasters, 10 artificial restrictions on business prac-
tices that were not grounded on any discernible principle of
regulatory economics or empirical evidence 1 - all needed to
be addressed. Under the Fowler Administration's interpreta-
tion of the Communications Act, the burden was to show that a
rule should be retained. In 1982, a regulatory task force
combed through all of the FCC's rules. While that effort was
not entirely successful, it led to several "underbrush" decisions
that eliminated needless regulations. 2
7. See, e.g., Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, recon.
granted in part, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), affd in
part and remanded in part, Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ
v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
8. Address by Chairman Fowler before the Oregon Association of Broadcasters,
Newport, Ore. (June 12, 1981).
9. Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 207 (1982).
10. A classic form of this paperwork requirement was formal community ascer-
tainment. Through individual and group interviews, the "broadcaster" (often a pub-
licly traded corporation with principal officers nonresident in the community) could
be said to "know" the needs and interests of the community. These requirements
were eliminated for radio by the Ferris Commission (Deregulation of Radio, 87
F.C.C.2d at 797, para. 49) and for television by the Fowler Commission (Television
Deregulation, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, paras. 45-54 (1984), Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 358, paras. 18-19 (1986)).
11. In 1962, the FCC adopted a rule creating a strong presumption that a licensee
which failed to operate a station for at least three years before reselling was guilty of
"trafficking" in licenses, that is, buying stations only to resell them at a profit. Proce-
dures on Transfer and Assignment Applications, Report and Order, 32 F.C.C. 689,
para. 27 (1962). The Fowler Commission abolished this rule, finding no basis to pun-
ish a broadcaster who, having brought or restored a station to successful operation,
desired to go on to repeat the effort elsewhere. Amendment of Section 73.3597, and
Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 971, paras. 7-8 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Elimination of Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation, Policy Statement
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Second, the theoretical foundation of broadcast regulation,
the spectrum scarcity argument, stemming from its fundamen-
tal articulation in the 1943 NBC case, 13 needed to be reexam-
ined. The economic concepts upon which the notion of
"scarcity" had been based were suspected of being wrong since
Professor Ronald Coase's seminal article in 1959,'4 and maybe
before.15
Apart from the theoretical shortcomings of the rationale, the
world of video had changed considerably by 1981 and would
change even more dramatically in the years ahead. Under
Chairman Ferris, the alphabet soup of technologies, including
low power TV (LPTV), multipoint distribution service (MDS),
direct broadcast satellite (DBS), and cable (CATV) 16 was ready
to boil. Cable penetration, boosted during the deregulatory ini-
tiatives advanced by Chairman Ferris, continued to expand
under Chairman Fowler's leadership. By 1987, the industry
had reached the magic fifty percent of American homes.' 7
LPTV was an administrative nightmare, but only because of an
overabundance of interest.' The subsequent freeze and thaw
of low power TV application processing, along with the slow,
but non-hemorrhaging growth of low power occurred during
the Fowler years. Microwave video services (MDS), Instruc-
tional Television Fixed Service (ITFS) and Private Operational
Fixed Service (OFS) were joined at the hip, as it were, in 1983,
to provide the opportunity for Multichannel Multipoint Distri-
bution Service (MMDS).' 9 Higher power DBS was given as
and Order in Docket No. 19743, 94 F.C.C.2d 619 (1983); Unnecessary Broadcast Regu-
lation ("Underbrush Policies"), Policy Statement and Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, MM Docket No. 83-376, F.C.C. 83-375, 48 Fed. Reg. 49,852, 54 RAD. REG. 2d (P &
F) 1043 (1983).
13. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943).
14. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1959).
15. See Comment, Old Standards in New Context: A Comparative Analysis of FCC
Regulation, 18 U. CHI L. REV. 78, 83 (1950).
16. Cable television often was referred to in the 1960s as CATV, standing for com-
munity antenna television. As the head end of the cable system began importing dis-
tant signals by microwave links and cable networks by satellite, the CATV label
dropped out of use.
17. See Television's Shifting Balance of Power, BROADCASTING, Oct. 12, 1987, at
42.
18. From 1984 to 1987, 37,000 applications had been processed. Low Power Televi-
sion and Television Translator Service, Report and Order in MM Docket No. 86-286,
F.C.C. 87-44, 52 Fed. Reg. 7,420, 62 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 423, para. 5 (1987).
19. Instructional Television Fixed Service, Report and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d 1203,
paras. 4, 16 (1983), recon., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 129, para. 27
(1984).
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much of a regulatory green light by the Fowler Administration
as possible,20 but got stalled out in the marketplace.
In short, the technology revolution that the 1970s predicted
continued to roll on during the Fowler Administration. There
was no discernable protectionism applied against new competi-
tors to over-the-air UHF and VHF broadcasting. Indeed, the
FCC continued the earlier approach of allowing the competi-
tive marketplace to blossom.21  Chairman Fowler, however,
went further in assessing regulation of broadcasting. Having
found the fundamental basis for treating broadcasting different
from print spectrum scarcity to be wanting, he advocated an
end to the content-based regulation of the broadcaster.
Mark Fowler maintained an abiding appreciation for the first
amendment. On the most prominent wall in his office hung a
reproduction of a Norman Rockwell painting depicting "free-
dom of speech," a gift from Commissioner Dennis Patrick.
Chairman Fowler was an avid reader during his chairmanship,
particularly of economics and history, notably the Federalist
Papers.2 He felt time was overdue for a reading of the first
20. Direct Broadcast Satellites, Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, paras. 7, 21
(1982). After some reluctance, the FCC allowed DBS licensees to use the frequencies
for nonbroadcast services as well. United States Satellite Broadcasting Co., Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 1 F.C.C. Rcd. 977, para. 18 (1986), recon., Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, 63 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 201, para. 9 (1987).
21. Chairman Ferris campaigned to end "protecting protectionism," a goal gener-
ally thought to be directed against the broadcasting industry and in favor of cable TV,
long disabled by overregulation. This effort led to a view by 1981 that broadcasters
had been left out of the opportunities offered by newer technologies. The notion of
remedying this impression arose in several Fowler speeches. In these speeches, he
urged broadcasters to enter into new technologies such as cellular telephone and digi-
tal paging, as they were more familiar than others with the workings of the FCC's
licensing apparatus. (Lin Broadcasting and Metromedia became major players in
these fields.) Further, the Fowler Administration authorized broadcasters to use
their subcarrier frequencies and aural basebands which are part of the frequencies
granted with a broadcast license, but audible only with special receiving equipment,
for nonbroadcast uses like paging and narrowcasting. FM Subsidiary Communica-
tions Authorizations, First Report and Order in BC Docket No. 82-536, F.C.C. 83-154,
48 Fed. Reg. 28,445, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1519, para. 54 (adopted Apr. 7, 1983);
Second Report and Order in BC Docket No. 82-536, F.C.C. 84-113, 49 Fed. Reg. 15,079,
55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1308, para. 5 (adopted Mar. 29, 1984) (FM subcarriers); Tele-
vision SCA Use, Second Report and Order in Docket No. 21-323, F.C.C. 84-116, 49 Fed.
Reg. 18,100, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1642, para. 25 (adopted Mar. 29, 1984) (TV aural
baseband). Not all opportunities to expand the number of outlets were seized under
Chairman Fowler, however, see infra notes 52, 54.
22. It was not uncommon for morning staff meetings (held at eight a.m. the first
few months, later rescheduled to eight-thirty a.m., mercifully for the night owls in the
group) to be spent discussing what Fowler had read the night before. He used his
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amendment that gave parity to print and broadcasting.
Articulation of his principal themes - focus towards a more
rational broadcast regulatory regime, repudiation of the trus-
teeship approach and advocacy of a market approach, and
championing of the first amendment right of broadcasters - all
occurred in "The Public's Interest," his first IRTS address, in
1981.23 His market approach to broadcasting could be summed
up in this sentence from the speech: "From here onward, the
public's interest must determine the public interest. '24
The next major milestone in Chairman Fowler's addresses
occurred before the North Carolina Association of Broadcasters
in 1982. In remarks entitled "Free the Broadcasting 10,000,"
Chairman Fowler, for the first time, articulated in greater de-
tail his "print model" for broadcasting. The model proposed
that:
[B]roadcasters should be as free from regulation as the news-
paper you share the press table with and compete with for ad-
vertisers. No renewal filings, no ascertainment exercises, no
content regulation, no ownership restrictions beyond those
that apply to media generally, free resale of properties, no peti-
tions to deny, no Brownie points for doing this right, no finger-
wagging for doing that wrong.25
At the same time, he also introduced as his ultimate vision
for broadcasting the concept of a modest user charge as a way
to win legislative change for the print model. The user charge
would not be imposed upon broadcasters alone; Fowler antici-
pated that all spectrum users, from common carrier microwave
to private radio licensees, would face some fee.
This was strong language from a chairman who was also the
champion of broadcaster freedoms, and who was often viewed
as a favorite of the broadcasting industry. The North Carolina
speech overlapped with an effort by the National Radio Broad-
casters Association, a short-lived trade association of radio
licensees that had defected from the NAB and eventually re-
joined them. The NRBA Chairmen had proposed some sort of
time as Chairman to rediscover the writings of Madison and Hamilton, and discus-
sions of philosophical issues sometimes overtook the day's scheduled appointments.
23. Address by Chairman Fowler before the International Radio Television Soci-
ety, reprinted in Fowler, The Public's Interest, 4 CoMM. & L. 51 (Winter 1982).
24. Id. at 56.
25. Address by Chairman Fowler before the North Carolina Association of Broad-
casters (Oct. 25, 1982), reprinted in part in Fowler's Analogy; Use of Print Model for
Deregulation, BROADCASTING, Oct. 25, 1982, at 23-25.
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license fee in exchange for a contract from the government.26
In the spring of 1983, Tim Wirth, who was Chairman of The
House Telecommunications Subcommittee, also endorsed a fee
as part of a deregulation approach to radio.27 Moreover,
Fowler's viewpoint was later endorsed by the New York Times
when it editorialized: "It's time to acknowledge that commer-
cial television runs itself at least as well as government could
run it. Congress should stop thinking about broadcast licenses
as public trust and should start thinking about them as a public
treasure.28
In Fowler's world, the broadcaster would respond to market
forces. There might or might not be some sort of fee, and non-
market needs, such as long-form news, public affairs and in-
structional children's programs, would be addressed through
public broadcasting. This theme renewed itself in Fowler's last
year, when he advocated, unsuccessfully, that Congress adopt a
spectrum auction system for unlicensed high frequency
channels.29
Just as Chairman Fowler wanted to articulate a vision in
broadcasting, so, too, did he assay to set forth a future for tele-
communications. Here, his speech-making had considerable in-
ternational significance. The international focus was
intentional.
Domestic common carrier policy had already incorporated
reliance on competition instead of regulation. Consider the
precedents awaiting Fowler: the "open skies" policies encour-
aging free entry into providing domestic satellite service;30
MCI's Execunet service entry into AT&T's long distance mar-
kets and competitive entry into the telephone equipment mar-
ket;31 the deregulation of receive-only earth stations;32 the
26. See Fowler Hails FCC Proposal, BROADCASTING, Sept. 20, 1982, at 42.
27. Name of the Game in Las Vegas: Spectrum Fees, BROADCASTING, Apr. 18,
1983, at 39.
28. What's Properly Public About TV, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1984, at A22, col. 1.
29. Spectrum Auctions: FCC Proposals for the Airwaves, Hearings on HI.170
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986) (statement
of Chairman Fowler).
30. Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities, Second Report and Order, 35
F.C.C.2d 844, paras. 6-7, recon., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 38 F.C.C.2d 665,
para. 30 (1972).
31. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978).
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POLICY-MAKING AT THE FOWLER FCC
decartelization of international record carriers;3 3 the competi-
tive carrier proceedings, aimed at loosening regulation of non-
dominant carriers such as MCI;3 4 and other like-minded poli-
cies. With competition a well-accepted piece of the U.S. policy
apparatus for telecommunications regulators, the real opportu-
nities for policy makers lay among highly-regulated European
and Asian nations.
Here, Mark Fowler could carry a message of U.S. success.
But, more importantly, by priming the regulatory environment
overseas for privatization and greater competition,3 5 it was pos-
sible to ease U.S. entry into those markets.
In Chairman Fowler's view, the U.S. experience in deregula-
tion should be studied and emulated by other countries previ-
ously resigned to requiring state operation of telecom-
munications and broadcasting. One of his favorite images for
this vision was what he called the "Popcorn Principle," first ar-
ticulated at Georgetown University in 1985.36 In his address he
described a hot air popper that someone had given his family
for Christmas: "The amazing thing about this machine is that it
produces so much popcorn, far more than it appears that the
machine can handle. And it produces all this popcorn without
the use of what was long thought to be the essential ingredient
of the process. '37 The principle thus adduced was this: "Re-
move what was thought an essential ingredient-heavy govern-
ment regulation-and it still works. In fact, it works better.
38
Chairman Fowler enjoyed sharing this message not only with
those who would visit his office in Washington, but in his trav-
els to other nations. In an address before the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris in 1985,39 con-
32. Regulation of Receive-Only Domestic Earth Satellite Stations, First Report
and Order, 74 F.C.C.2d 205, para. 1 (1979).
33. See International Record Carriers, Policy Statement and Order in Docket No.
19660, 76 F.C.C.2d 115, para. 116 (1979).
34. For a good review of this landmark march from regulation to permissive for-
bearance of nondominant common carriers in the communications field, see MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
35. One way privatization was recognized was the FCC's support of private com-
petitors to INTELSAT's satellite system. International Satellite Systems, Report and
Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 1046, para. 68 (1985).
36. "U.S. Global Telecommunications: The Popcorn Principle," Address by
Chairman Fowler, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International
Studies (Feb. 26, 1985), reprinted in 2 TELEMATICS 11 (1985).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. "American Telecommunications: Notes of A Friendly Gardener," Address by
1988]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
sidered a highlight of his administration, Fowler urged Euro-
pean nations just awakening from the slumber of state
ownership of telecommunications services to give private sys-
tems a chance. In a companion speech delivered a few days
later in London,4" he articulated his belief in market forces as
opposed to government intervention:
And there is nothing base or crude at all in allowing people to
live life literally to their heart's content. The marketplace is
one important way people have to express what they want
with their lives and in their lives. The market is not the Alpha
and Omega of satisfaction. There are some things money can-
not buy, to be sure. But a vigorous market, one that allows
ease of entry and a range of choice, is the start of the stuff of
human happiness. And those who would over-regulate it
would rob us of the flea market and leave us with the flea.a"
Beyond this, and back at home, Chairman Fowler proposed a
radically deregulated domestic telephone environment, apply-
ing the competitive model even to the monopoly situation of
local telephone exchange service. His "Back to the Future"
speech4 2 came to describe an entire regulatory strategy. Fowler
envisioned the future as one in which competition, not regula-
tion, would dictate choice and service in the marketplace. In
this far-reaching, but by no means implausible vision of com-
mon carrier regulation,43 Fowler challenged the assumption
Chairman Fowler, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Nov.
18, 1985).
40. "On Gardening, Telecommunications and Capitalism," Address by Chairman
Fowler, Information Technology Committee of the United Kingdom Parliament
(Nov. 21, 1985).
41. Id.
42. Fowler, Halprin & Schlichting, "Back to the Future:"A Model for Telecommu-
nications, 38 FED. CoMM. L.J. 145 (1986) (The speech was used as the basis for this
article.).
43. For example, in Nebraska, the local phone company may, on 90 days' notice,
increase rates up to ten percent annually, unless two percent of affected consumers
sign a petition opposing the increase, in which case the state public utility commission
must hold a hearing and pass upon the increase. Services other than local exchange
are nearly free of rate-of-return regulation. See TESKE, REPORT ON STATE REGULA-
TION 1 (1987) (prepared for U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment). Under
the Vermont Public Service Board's "Social Contract," the Vermont Public Service
Advocate is allowed to negotiate a five-year price contract not based on rate-of-return
formulas with the local exchange carrier. Id. In addition, Alfred Sikes, NTIA Admin-
istrator, views the FCC's proposed changes as "considerably less comprehensive" than
his own agency's recommendations. Sikes, Reforming Regulation of the Telephone
Business: The NTIA Regulatory Alternatives Report, 5 CoMM. LAW. 17 (Fall 1987).
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that monopoly carriers required tariffs to control market
power.
While much attention is paid to what is said by an FCC chair-
man, the initial significance of this attention may be more a
function of the status of the office than the words spoken. The
FCC Chair, let alone the FCC, does not operate in a vacuum.
The FCC is, after all, an agency of Congress," and Congress can
at any time eliminate the agency. Moreover, as the saga of the
AT&T divestiture reminds us, other parts of the government,
in particular the judicial and executive branches, play a role in
deciding communications policy in the United States. Finally,
when discussing international matters, one cannot ignore the
Department of State, the National Telecommunications and In-
formation Administration (NTIA) in the Department of Com-
merce, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the international
organizations to which the United States is a party.
Given this, it is remarkable that one individual can make a
difference in setting the course of the communications agenda
in the United States, particularly where the issues involved are
complicated and hard for the public to understand. For exam-
ple, who outside of those following the intricacies of the divesti-
ture decree can be persuaded to discuss Judge Harold Greene's
judgment call in his 1987 line-of-business restrictions ruling?45
But the current communications policy debate seems to hinge
on such matters.
As for broadcasting, the Fowler Administration varied from
the prevailing attitude about regulation, but it did not cause a
wholesale dismantling of the regulatory apparatus. The FCC
operates under the "public interest, convenience, or necessity"
standard in the Communications Act of 1934,46 a vague articula-
tion that admits of regulatory variations on most matters.
Despite extravagant claims about the demise of the Commis-
sion's primary content regulations 47 and the Fairness Doc-
trine,48 they remained in force49 during his tenure. Even non-
44. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
45. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
46. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1982).
47. For example, id. § 315 requires that a licensee who gives a candidate for public
office an opportunity, free or paid, to appear, must give all other candidates for that
office an equal opportunity. News programs, news interviews, on-the-spot coverage
and documentaries are exempt. Id.
48. The fairness doctrine required licensees to cover controversial issues of public
importance and to afford opportunities for contrasting viewpoints on those issues. It
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renewal of an FM station for failure to make good faith efforts
to meet its program commitment to the agency was affirmed
under his administration.50  Furthermore, broadcasters con-
tinue to have an obligation to program to the needs of
children.5'
. Even so, the era should be characterized as producing both
philosophical and structural change, and generating energy,
concrete achievements, and some failures. The Fowler Com-
mission avoided some proposals unpopular with broadcasters.
In particular, it declined to adopt a proposal submitted during
the Carter Administration to increase the number of VHF allo-
cations based on a revised (and contentious) definition of the
protection to be afforded existing licensees.52 However, the
Commission did increase the number of FM radio allocations
by more than 600, a substantial rise in service and competi-
tion.53 Nevertheless, it declined to space AM stations closer to-
gether, thereby allowing more stations, a position favored by
Chairman Ferris.54 This rejection, though unfaithful to mar-
ketplace principles, seems wise given the public's preference
for FM and the resulting financial difficulties of many AM sta-
tions. Further, the Commission's reluctance to change the rules
imposing mandatory carriage of local signals by cable systems
can be viewed as an accommodation to broadcasters, despite the
first amendment infirmities posed by the original rules.55
was eliminated as unconstitutional and contrary to public policy under Chairman
Dennis Patrick's chairmanship. Syracuse Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,768, 63 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 541, paras. 17-26 (1987), appeal
pending.
49. See, e.g., Syracuse Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 99
F.C.C.2d 1389 (1984), remanded sub nom. Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
50. See, e.g., West Coast Media, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 331
(1981), affd sub nom. West Coast Media v. FCC, 695 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
51. TV Programming for Children, Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, para. 46
(1984), affd sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 756 F.2d 899, 901 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
52. Table of Television Channel Allotments, Notice of Proposed Rule Making in
Gen. Docket No. 80-499, FCC 80-545, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,902, 72,934-35 (released Oct. 21,
1980).
53. FM Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d 152, para. 87 (1983).
The actual number of additional stations and their locations did not appear until the
ground rules providing for shorter separations were established. Increasing the
Availability of FM Broadcast Assignments, Notice of Proposed Rule Making in MM
Docket No. 84-231, FCC 84-66, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,214, 11,216-17 (released Mar. 14, 1984).
54. AM Broadcasting in Region 2, Fourth Report, 89 F.C.C.2d 546, para. 6 (1982).
55. Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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The rule limiting the number of AM, FM or TV stations one
individual could own was raised to twelve (with a percentage
concentration cap). This change was a relatively modest adjust-
ment. 6 The rule forbidding transfers of broadcast licenses
within three years of acquisition was eliminated.57 But there is
no hard evidence of the harm or benefit from this change with
respect to the public. Other structural changes occurred as
well.58
There were limits, however - legal, political, and self-im-
posed - which narrowed Fowler's field of action. He failed to
win repeal of the financial interest/syndication rules, 59 stymied
by a whirlwind lobbying effort mounted by the Hollywood pro-
duction community and independent television stations. This
led Congress to interdict the proposal and previously support-
ive Reagan administration agencies, such as the Departments
of Justice and Commerce, to abandon it. The rule increasing
station ownership to twelve was itself a compromise imposed
by Congress. The original Fowler proposal would have uncap-
ped the number of broadcast properties one entity could own,
subject to antitrust laws regulating local or national concentra-
tion. In his final days as chairman, and after years of strong
defense of the first amendment in broadcasting, he found him-
self in the unanimous majority which concluded that a group of
radio broadcasts were indecent, although no punishments were
meted out.60
56. Seven-Station-Rule, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 4,666, 57
RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 966, para. 23 (1984).
57. Transfer of Broadcast Facilities, Report and Order in BC Docket No. 81-897,
FCC 82-519, 47 Fed. Reg. 55,924, 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1081, para. 21 (1982).
58. See, e.g., Subscription Video, Report and Order in Gen. Docket No. 85-305,
FCC 86-526, 52 Fed. Reg. 6,152, 62 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 389 (1986) (releasing subscrip-
tion TV and DBS services from 47 U.S.C. § 315 (equal opportunity) and 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a)(7) (reasonable access) provisions of the Communications Act and reclassify-
ing such services as non-broadcast); Multiple Ownership (Regional Concentration of
Control Provisions), Report and Order, MM Docket No. 84-19, FCC 84-156, 49 Fed.
Reg. 34,541, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1389 (1984) (repealing regional concentration of
control provisions of FCC's multiple ownership rules which prohibited common own-
ership of three radio or TV stations where two are located within 100 miles of the
third).
59. See, e.g., Amendment of the Commission's Syndication and Financial Interest
Rule, Notice of Proposed Rule Making in BC Docket No. 82-345, FCC 82-300, 47 Fed.
Reg. 32,959 (1982).
60. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, (WYSP(FM)), 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 2705 (1987); Pacifica Found., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 2698 (1987); Regents of the University of California, Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 2703 (1987).
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There is no denying that Chairman Fowler will be
remembered for trying to change the terms of the debate. As
noted, his operating assumption was that the absence of govern-
ment regulation was the natural order of things. Those wishing
to advance or maintain regulation had the burden of persua-
sion. He was a tireless advocate for the proposition that broad-
casters should be treated no differently from newspapers when
it came to first amendment rights.
Perhaps his sensitivity to expression grew out of his experi-
ence as a radio broadcaster. His towering height, his booming
voice, and his indefatigable congeniality towards perfect stran-
gers, made him an ideal speaker and public personality. If the
Chautaqua Platform Society was still underway in this country,
no doubt Chairman Fowler would have been a leading celebrity
on the circuit. 1
Ultimately, with Mark Fowler, what you saw was what you
got. He was an unmitigated protagonist of the Reagan Admin-
istration. During the first term, perhaps more than at any
other federal agency, the "Reagan revolution" which favored
market solutions had an opportunity to be considered sincerely
on its merits.
Of course, anyone who hangs around in Washington, D.C.
long enough knows that there is a huge, though invisible, pen-
dulum that swings over the city. Regulatory approaches follow
the path of that suspended orb. Through his words and
through the actions of the Commission, Chairman Fowler
might be seen as a modern day Jean Bernard Foucault. Fou-
cault, it will be recalled, was the nineteenth century French
physicist who recognized that a pendulum could prove that the
earth rotated. For Fowler, the pendulum continued to swing,
but the policy debate could rotate.
In Fowler's world, competition deserved a try at least as
much as regulation. In Fowler's world, broadcasters and print
journalists would receive the same treatment under the first
amendment. In Fowler's world, market forces rather than
their government proxies would decide the flow of services and
goods in society. And in Fowler's world, market forces, with
their genie of competition, generally would lead to benefits for
all segments of society. As he was fond of saying, when the
61. See W. SHIRER, 20TH CENTURY JOURNEY: A MEMOIR OF A LIFE AND THE TIMES
155-64 (1985).
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water level increases, all the boats rise up.6 2
In the short time since he left the FCC, it is impossible to
gauge whether Fowler's policies were ahead of their time, right
on target, or quite wide of the mark. But through his nearly
200 public addresses, Mark Fowler managed to light the sparks
of a vigorous policy debate.
Certainly there is more choice in both video and telecommu-
nications. The number of over-the-air television stations in-
creased about twenty-five percent during Fowler's term,63 and
the choice of telecommunications offerings, from equipment to
services, continued to expand. Choice is difficult, of course, and
some of the new choices may not mark a new height in techno-
logical cultural development.64 Further, one need not be a con-
tent analyst to conclude that in commercial over-the-air
television, there is no yawing overload of instructional or edu-
cational children's programs. And one senses a fresh concern
about commercials that appear among the children's programs
that remain.65 At some point in the debate about children's tel-
evision and the marketplace, we need to remind ourselves that
we are, after all, talking about children.
Finally, in writing the history of a deconstructionist period,
one must not attribute too little to independent vectors operat-
ing outside government. The era in which Chairman Fowler
served in government saw unparalleled development of the
technologies of mass media and telecommunications and of the
attention the economy paid to them.66 On that score, he was at
the right time and at the right place. It was a time for rethink-
62. At the same time, he recognized that not all programming would emerge in
the marketplace and so he supported public financing of non-commercial broadcast-
ing. In addition, he favored target subsidies for poorer telephone subscribers through
lifeline programs.
63. See BROADCASTING CABLE YEARBOOK A2 (1981) (there were 1,020 TV stations,
commercial and non-commercial, in the U.S. by the end of 1980); BROADCASTING
CABLE YEARBOOK A2 (1987) (there were 1,285 TV stations by the end of 1986, a gain of
over twenty-five percent).
64. See, e.g., Brenner, Rise of Home TV Shopping Proves Theory of the Ledger
Class, L.A. Times, May 10, 1987, at IV3, col. 2.
65. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
66. Channels of Communication, a monthly magazine initially devoted to social
criticism of television, was highly critical of the Fowler administration during its first
few years. By the time Chairman Fowler left office, the magazine had renamed itself
Channels, The Business of Communications, and transformed its editorial focus to
concentrate almost exclusively on the economics of the video transmission and pro-
duction marketplace.
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ing old ideas. As a result, things will never be quite the same
again.
